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Discursive Representation
JOHN S. DRYZEK and SIMON NIEMEYER Australian National University
D emocracy can entail the representation of discourses as well as persons or groups. We explainand advocate discursive representation; explore its justifications, advantages, and problems;and show how it can be accomplished in practice. This practice can involve the selection of
discursive representatives to a formal Chamber of Discourses and more informal processes grounded in
the broader public sphere. Discursive representation supports many aspects of deliberative democracy
and is especially applicable to settings such as the international system lacking a well-defined demos.
I n his recent survey of the legitimacy claims of un-elected representatives, Saward (2008) opens witha quote from Bono, and so shall we1:
I represent a lot of people [in Africa] who have no voice
at all. . . . They haven’t asked me to represent them.
Nobody electedBono, he is not formally accountable to
anybody, andmost of the people he claims to represent
have no idea who he is or what he proposes. Never-
theless, his representation claim makes some sense. It
makes most sense not in terms of representing African
people, nor in terms of representing a place called
Africa, but rather in terms of representing a discourse
of Africa. “Africa” as constructed in this discourse may
bear some relation to people and places, but more im-
portant is that it constructs them in a particular kind
of way: as victims of an unjust world and the caprice
of nature, lacking much in the way of agency them-
selves, with claims on the conscience of the wealthy.2
These claims stop at a better deal within the existing
world system, falling short of structural transforma-
tion. A cynic might also see a place for celebrity and
conspicuous charity in the discourse. This discourse is
transnational, may be only weakly present in Africa
itself, and is generally only one among several or many
discourses that particular individuals who engage it (be
it at G8 meetings or live8 concerts) subscribe to.
Discursive representation does, then, already hap-
pen, although as our invocation of Bono suggests, it is
not necessarily done without controversy. Bono him-
self might insist he is representing real people, not a
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1 Sophisticated and wide ranging, Saward’s paper remains wedded
to the representation of people rather than discourses.
2 On social constructions of Africa, see Ferguson (2006).
discourse. His criticsmight accept that he is indeed rep-
resenting a discourse, but not one that actually benefits
people in Africa. In this article we make the case for
representing discourses as an integral aspect of democ-
racy, especially deliberative or discursive democracy.
We linkdiscursive representation to theories of deliber-
ative democracy that emphasize the engagement of dis-
courses in existing institutions of government and the
broader public sphere, and those that ponder thedesign
of deliberative institutions as part of the architecture
of government. Discursive representation is oneway to
redeem the promise of deliberative democracy when
the deliberative participation of all affected by a col-
lective decision is infeasible. We show how to organize
representation in a Chamber of Discourses and how
to evaluate representation practices in the more infor-
mal interplay of discourses in the public sphere. We
draw contrasts with more conventional notions about
representing individuals and groups, and identify dis-
cursive counterparts to concepts of authorization and
accountability that figure in most accounts of repre-
sentation. Representation is conventionally defined as
“substantive acting for others,” in Pitkin’s (1967) terms;
“others” may be captured in terms of the discourses to
which they subscribe. Whether discourses are repre-
sented by particular persons is an open question. We
show not only how to designate discursive representa-
tives, but also demonstrate less tangible ways in which
discourses can find representation. We do not claim
that representation of discourses is always preferable
to that of individuals, just that it is different, sometimes
feasible when the representation of persons is not so
feasible (especially in transnational settings lacking a
well-defined demos), and, on some criteria and in some
settings, may do better.3
A discourse can be understood as a set of categories
and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judg-
ments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities. It en-
ables the mind to process sensory inputs into coherent
accounts, which can then be shared in intersubjectively
meaningful fashion. At a basic level, any political dis-
course will normally feature an ontology of entities
recognized as existing or relevant. Among these enti-
ties, some (e.g., individuals, social classes, groups, or
states) will be ascribed agency, the capacity to act,
while in competing discourses the same entities will be
3 We believe the term “discursive representation” was first used by
Keck (2003) for whom in international politics it means representing
perspectives or positions, not discourses as we define them.
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denied agency (e.g., liberal individualists deny the
agency of classes). For those entities recognized as
agents, somemotives will be recognized, others denied.
So, for example, administrative discourses recognize
the agency of managers motivated by public interest
values, whereas market liberal discourses ascribe to
administrators only rational egoism.Any discoursewill
also contain an account of the relationships taken to
prevail between agents and others. So, economistic
discourses see competition as natural, whereas fem-
inist discourses would see the possibility of cooper-
ation while recognizing pervasive patriarchy. Finally,
discourses rely on metaphors and other rhetorical de-
vices. So, a “spaceship earth” metaphor is central to
some environmental discourses, whereas horror sto-
ries about “welfare queens” and the like are central to
individualistic conservative discourses on social policy
(Alker and Sylvan 1994; Dryzek and Berejikian 1993).
Discourses enable as well as constrain thought,
speech, and action.4 Any discourse embodies some
conception of common sense and acceptable knowl-
edge; it may embody power by recognizing some in-
terests as valid while repressing others. However, dis-
courses are not just a surface manifestation of inter-
ests because discourses help constitute identities and
their associated interests. The relevant array of dis-
courses depends on the issue at hand (although some
discourses can apply to a number of different issues)
and can evolve with time. For example, when it comes
to economic issues, relevant discourses might include
market liberalism, antiglobalization, social democracy,
and sustainable development. When it comes to inter-
national security, pervasive discourses might include
realism, counterterror, Islamic radicalism, and neocon-
servatism. Discourses do not constitute the entirety of
nonindividual political phenomena that may demand
representation. In particular, discourses should not be
confused with groups defined by ascriptive character-
istics such as race, class, or gender; coalitions of actors
who may favor a policy for different reasons; interests,
which although they may be constituted by discourses,
can also exist independent of discourse; interest groups,
which have a tangible organization that discourses lack;
or opinions on particular issues, which may be embed-
ded in particular discourses, but need not be.
WHY REPRESENT DISCOURSES
Given that othermodes of representation already exist,
why might discursive representation be attractive? We
begin our argument through reference to the ratio-
nality of systematically involving multiple discourses
in collective decision. We then turn to an ontological
justification of the priority of discourses, grounded in
the discursive psychology of a world of fractured indi-
vidual commitments. This account enables an ethical
argument that even the individual autonomy prized by
liberals can be promoted by representing the multi-
ple discourses each individual inhabits. We then show
4 In like fashion,AnthonyGiddens’ structuration theory treats social
structures as simultaneously enabling and constraining.
that discursive representation is especially appropri-
ate when a well-bounded demos is hard to locate, and
helps realize the promise of contemporary theories of
deliberative democracy.
Rationality
In a long tradition encompassing, among others, J.S.
Mill, John Dewey, Karl Popper (1966), and Charles
Lindblom (1965), democracy is seen as more rational
in the production of collective outcomes than its alter-
natives. It provides opportunities for policy proposals
to be criticized from a variety of directions, both be-
fore and after their implementation, thus providing the
ideal setting for systematic trial anderror inpolicymak-
ing. Democracy is, inMill’s terms, a “Congress ofOpin-
ions.” The key consideration here is that all the vantage
points for criticizing policy get represented— not that
these vantage points get represented in proportion to
the number of people who subscribe to them. When
it comes to representing arguments, proportionality
may actually be undesirable because it can pave the
way to groupthink and the silencing of uncomfortable
voices from the margins or across divides. Sunstein’s
(2000) deployment of social psychological findings on
group polarization show that if members of a group
(e.g., a jury) start with an inclination in one direction,
deliberation will have the effect of moving the average
position in the group toward an extreme version of that
inclination. If a substantial majority of the population
lean in one direction, proportionality in their represen-
tation in the forum may produce this movement to an
extreme. Thus, it is important from the point of view of
responsiveness to the initial distribution of positions,
let alone collective rationality, to have countervailing
discourses well represented in the forum at the outset
to check this polarizing effect.
For policy-making rationality, then, all relevant dis-
courses should get represented, regardless of how
many people subscribe to each. Rationality may even
benefit from the presence of a vantage point to which
nobody subscribes; such was presumably the rationale
for the use of a “Devil’s Advocate” when evaluating
cases for sainthood in the Catholic Church (which is,
of course, not a paragon of democracy in any other
sense).5
Now, it is one thing to ask that for the sake of
rationality all vantage points, perspectives, or view-
points get represented more or less equally in a fo-
rum, but quite another to ask that all relevant dis-
courses get represented. Our justification here is that
discourses have a solidity that perspectives do not. Fur-
thermore, discourses can be measured and described
(we explore methods later), whereas perspectives can
be more elusive. In contemplating the representation
of perspectives, Young (2000, 143–44) solves this elu-
siveness problem by assuming that “to the extent that
persons are positioned similarly in those [social] struc-
tures, then they have similar perspectives,” such that
5 The Devil’s Advocate was abolished by Pope John Paul II, leading
to a proliferation of saints.
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analysis of social structure can guide the selection of
representatives. In contrast, we are open to discourses
having a force independent of, and possibly prior to,
social structure. Discursive representation is a concep-
tually simplermatter than the complex representations
of perspectives, interests, opinions, and groups that are
the ingredients of what Young calls “communicative
democracy.”
An Ontological Justification
What are the key entities that populate the political
world and merit representation? In the liberal tradi-
tion, the answer would be “individuals.” However, as
Castiglione and Warren (2006, 13) point out,
. . .from the perspective of thosewho are represented,what
is represented are not persons as such, but some of the
interests, identities, and values that persons have or hold.
Representative relationships select for specific aspects of
persons, by framing wants, desires, discontents, values and
judgments in ways that they become publicly visible, artic-
ulated in language and symbols, and thus politically salient.
Thus, the whole person cannot be represented (see also
Young 2000, 133). Which “aspects of persons” merit
representation, and what happens when they point
in different directions? This question has received a
number of analytical treatments. Sagoff (1988) distin-
guished between the “consumer” and “citizen” prefer-
ences of individuals; so (to use one of his examples),
the same individuals who would as consumers love to
use a ski resort will as citizens oppose its construc-
tion in a wilderness area. Sagoff resolves the prob-
lem by asserting the superiority of politics and citizen
preferences over markets and consumer preferences;
economists wedded to contingent valuation would dis-
agree, as would market liberals. Goodin (1986) speaks
of “laundering preferences” before they are ready to
be put into collective choice processes. When it comes
to elections, Brennan and Lomasky (1993) argue that
the very fact that any one person’s vote is almost al-
ways inconsequential releases voters’ “expressive pref-
erences” as opposed to their material self-interest in
deciding whom to vote for. Thus, in choosing whether
to emphasize voting systems ormarkets, we also choose
the relative weight of individuals’ expressive prefer-
ences and their material interests. Expressive prefer-
ences might involve ethics or identity politics.
We prefer a less analytical and more empirical treat-
ment of what Elster (1986) calls the “multiple self.”
Speaking in terms of preferences is unduly restrictive,
for aspects of the multiple self may not be reducible to
preferences (and the instrumental form of rationality it
implies). This question can be illuminated by discursive
psychology (Edwards and Potter 1992). Discursive psy-
chology takes seriously the Wittgensteinian notion of
language games as the framework in which cognition
is possible. The mind itself lies at the intersection of
such games: “I inhabit many different discourses each
of which has its own cluster of significations” (Harre´
andGillett 1994, 25). Subjectivity is, then,multifaceted:
“most of us will fashion a complex subjectivity from
participation inmany different discourses” (25). This is
not a matter of an autonomous self picking and choos-
ing across discourses because the multifaceted self is
constituted by discourses; we cannot think outside dis-
courses because they also enter and help constitute
the mind. However, the very fact that each individual
engagesmultiple discourses provides some freedom for
maneuver, such that “fluid positionings instead of fixed
roles” are possible (36), which is crucial when it comes
to the possibilities for the reflection that is central to
deliberative and democratic interaction. Thus, persons
are not simply bundles of discourses; autonomous in-
dividuals can reflect across the discourses they engage,
even as they can never fully escape their constraints.
The individual selves prized by liberals can, then, be
quite fractured by the discourses that the individual
engages. Group representation is no less problematic
in this light. Group representation is normally tied
to descriptive representation, where “blacks represent
blacks and women represent women,” as Mansbridge
(1999) puts it. There may be more than one discourse
relevant to black interests or women’s interests, which
a unitary framing of that group’s interests will not
capture. Some of its advocates recognize the need to
“pluralize group representation,” but then face inde-
terminacy in how far to go in representing different
subgroups (Dovi 2002, 741). This indeterminacy can be
ameliorated (although not eliminated) if we can show
how the range of relevant discourses can be described.
Ethics
The liberal argument for the representation of indi-
viduals has an ethical as well as an ontological as-
pect, on the grounds that individuals are capable of
self-government, and the repositories of moral worth.
There are nonliberal arguments in which groups, so-
cial classes, and communities have similar moral stand-
ing, but what about discourses? There is actually no
need to give discourses any moral standing that is not
reducible to that of the individuals who subscribe to
them. Yet, there is still a moral (as opposed to onto-
logical) argument for discursive representation. Once
we accept the insight from discursive psychology that
any individual may engage multiple discourses, it is
important that all these discourses get represented.
Otherwise, the individual in his or her entirety is not
represented. Discursive representation may, then do a
morally superior because more comprehensive job of
representing persons than do theories that treat indi-
viduals as unproblematic wholes. Liberals might reply
that each individual should manage the demands of
competing discourses him- or herself prior to seeking
representation because an autonomous person is one
who chooses not just among options, but also among
reasons for that choice (Watson 1975). Yet, demanding
this management prior to representationmay paradox-
ically disrespect individual autonomy, if it requires the
individual to repress some aspect of his- or herself. For
example, a government employee may choose to vote
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for party X because he or she fears that party Y, whose
platform he or she otherwise prefers onmoral grounds,
will undertake budget cuts that endanger his or her job.
Their moral preferences are repressed in their voting
choice. Discursive representation would ensure both
aspects of the self of this government employee get
represented in subsequent deliberations.
The Decline of the Demos
Rationality, ontology, and ethics can justify discursive
representation in any time or place. We now introduce
some developments in contemporary politics that re-
inforce the case. Democratic theory has traditionally
been tied closely to the idea of a well-bounded demos:
no demos, no democracy. Correspondingly, in Pitkin’s
(1967) classic statement about representation, the def-
inition of the people is logically prior to contemplation
of their representation. Representative democracy in
this light requires a precisely bounded citizenry, nor-
mally defined by membership of a political unit orga-
nized on a territorial basis, which then elects represen-
tatives. However, today’s world is increasingly unlike
this. Authority increasingly escapes the sovereign state,
to be located in, or diffused throughout, the global
system. Sometimes authority is transferred to an inter-
national governmental organization such as the World
Trade Organization (W T O). When a tangible organi-
zation such as the WTO exists, it is possible to imagine
global elections to its board, but impossible to institute
them in any feasible future. Themost that can be hoped
for is the representation of states, which entails repre-
sentation of peoples at one very considerable remove
(and, of course, not all states are internally democratic).
Currently, the WTO runs according to a single dis-
course, that of market-oriented neoliberalism. A more
democratic WTO would be responsive to a broader
range of discourses, such as the counterdiscourses con-
structed by antiglobalization activists.
Political authority is also increasingly diffused into
informal networks made up of governmental and
nongovernmental actors, be they businesses, profes-
sional associations, unions, nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs), social movements, or individual ac-
tivists (Rhodes 1997). Networked governance is almost
impossible to render accountable in standard demo-
cratic terms because there is often no unique demos
associated with a network. This is especially true when
networks cross national boundaries. If networks can-
not be held formally accountable to any well-defined
demos, we have to look in other directions to render
them accountable. One way of doing this is to try to
ensure that a network is not dominated by a single
discourse whose terms are accepted uncritically by all
involved actors in a way that marginalizes other dis-
courses that could claim relevance. For example, the
international networks of finance and capital described
by Castells (1997) have generally been dominated by
economistic discourses to the exclusion of social jus-
tice discourses. International environmental networks
have often been dominated by a moderate discourse
of sustainable development that by the lights of more
radical green discourses is too easily accommodated to
economic growth rather than effective environmental
conservation.
If the demos is in decline, then Ankersmit’s (2002)
contention that the process of representation itself con-
stitutes any “people” gains in plausibility. This kind of
indeterminacy canbeembracedbydiscursive represen-
tation, under which different discourses can constitute
the relevant people in different ways. So, for example,
in a cosmopolitan discourse, “the people” is global; in
a nationalist discourse, it is always more particular.
Discourses in Theories of Deliberative
Democracy
Deliberative democracy ought to be less wedded to
conventional notions of representing persons than is
the aggregative kind of democracy to which it is of-
ten contrasted because it puts talk and communica-
tion at the center of democracy (Chambers 2003, 308).
From the viewpoint of the discursive self in deliberative
democracy, it may then bemore important for the qual-
ity of deliberation that all relevant discourses get repre-
sented, rather than that all individuals get represented.
As Mansbridge (2003, 524) points out, in deliberative
democracy there is no requirement that perspectives
get “presented by a number of legislators proportional
to the numbers of citizens who hold those perspec-
tives.” Weaver et al. (2007) show experimentally that
the “weight” of a message in the forum depends more
on the frequency with which it is repeated than on
the number of people who present it, a finding that
further undermines any argument for proportionality
in representation in communicative settings.
The account of deliberative democracy presented by
Dryzek (2000) highlights the generation and engage-
ment of discourses in the public sphere. Public opinion
is then defined as the provisional outcome of the con-
testation of discourses as transmitted to the state or
other public authority. This feature fits nicely with dis-
cursive psychology because the reflective agents who
populate a deliberative democracy can be seen as nego-
tiating the field of discourses in which they necessarily
participate, with more or less competence. This con-
ceptualization of deliberative democracy is compati-
ble with, but more precisely connected to discourses,
and so their representation, than the formulations of
Habermas (1996) concerning diffuse “subjectless com-
munication” that produces public opinion and of Ben-
habib (1996, 74) concerning an “anonymous public
conversation” in “interlocking and overlapping net-
works and associations of deliberation, contestation,
and argumentation.” Benhabib, Dryzek, and Haber-
mas all assign the public sphere a central place in
the architecture of deliberative democracy. Spaces in
the public sphere have proliferated along with new
communications media. Democratic legitimacy is gen-
erated in the extent to which collective decisions are
consistent with the constellation of discourses existing
within the public sphere, in the degree to which this
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balance is itself under the decentralized control of
reflective, competent, and informed actors (Dryzek
2001). This is not the place to debate the pros and
cons of these approaches; suffice it to say that there
are versions of deliberative democracy for which dis-
courses and their contestation or engagement are a
central feature, begging the question of how theymight
be represented. There are also versions of deliberative
democracy that havemoved beyond the idea that effec-
tive deliberation requires a demos with a well-specified
set of actors unitedbybondsof social solidarity. Indeed,
it is in such settings that key features of deliberative
democracy are now being tested (Scheuerman 2006).
In Joshua Cohen’s classic statement, deliberative le-
gitimacy is to be found in all those subject to a de-
cision participating in deliberation about its content
(Cohen 1989). However, given the impossibility of or-
ganizing participation by all those affected, another
solution needs to be found in order that communica-
tion from those not in the deliberative forum itself be
somehow represented inside the forumwhen the delib-
eration of all yields to the deliberation of some (Manin
1987). Critics of deliberative democracy (Shapiro 1999;
Walzer 1999) have pointed out that effective face-to-
face deliberation can only ever involve a handful of
people. Thus, seeking democratic legitimacy via par-
ticipation in deliberation by all those affected looks
futile. Conventional electoral representation to reduce
the number of deliberators is one solution, but elec-
tions themselves are not necessarily deliberative affairs
(and proposals to make them more deliberative rarely
involve anything like the deliberation of all). Further-
more, the number of legislators in a general purpose
legislature is still generally too large for them all to
deliberate together.
Discursive representation offers a solution to this
key problem of scale that confronts deliberative
democracy. The number of discourses that need rep-
resenting on any issue is generally much smaller than
the number of representatives in general-purpose leg-
islatures, so it ought to be possible to constitute a small
issue-specific deliberating group that contains repre-
sentatives of all relevant discourses. We now ask how
such small groups might be constituted formally in or-
der to combine effective deliberation with discursive
representation. Then we turn to more informal ways of
securing discursive representation that resonate with
accounts of deliberative democracy emphasizing en-
gagement of discourses in a broad public sphere.
FORMALLY CONSTITUTING THE CHAMBER
OF DISCOURSES
It is possible to imagine a Chamber of Discourses cor-
responding to more familiar assemblies based on the
representation of individuals. Existing parliamentary
chambers do of course feature discourses, but only
unsystematically, as a by-product of electoral repre-
sentation.
We have already argued that there is no need for
proportionality in discursive representation. Epistemic
justifications for deliberation (Estlund 1997) also sug-
gest that the composition of the deliberative forum
need not mirror that of the population at large. How-
ever, it is important to ensure that each relevant dis-
course gets articulate representation, and we should be
wary of the “lottery of talent” introducing inequalities
across discursive representatives. Having multiple rep-
resentatives for each discourse ought to ameliorate at
least chance factors. It may also be true that the na-
ture of a discourse is associated with the capacity of its
adherents to articulate its content. Here, deliberative
democrats would stress the need for forum design to
bring out the “communicative competence” of repre-
sentatives. Experience with deliberative “minipublics”
shows that ordinary citizens can become capable delib-
erators.
In thinking about the Chamber of Discourses, we
must allow that in deliberation individuals reflect on
the discourses they engage and can change their minds.
Mansbridge (2003, 524) suggests that when “delibera-
tive mechanisms work well” they should select against
“the least informed political positions in the polity.” It
is entirely possible that particular discourses initially
identified for representation in the forum will not sur-
vive deliberation unscathed, but that may not be so
bad if the transformation renders the constellation of
discourses more publicly defensible. Niemeyer (2004)
demonstrates this process empirically. On an environ-
mental issue deliberated in a citizen’s jury, he shows
that a discourse that tried to assuage anxieties on both
sides of the issue was transformed for its adherents
toward a more clearly preservationist discourse. The
possibility that discourses get transformed once rep-
resented does mean that discursive representation is
inconsistentwith a “delegate”model of representation.
We should also recognize that discourses can be
transformed, or even constituted, by the very fact
of their representation. Representing a previously
marginalized discourse may mean that a particular cat-
egory of people gets constituted as agents within the
discourse. For example, the fact that the discourse of
environmental justice became heard in policy-making
processes in the United States in the late 1980s val-
idated the agency in environmental affairs of low-
income ethnic minority victims of pollution. The dis-
course of Africa associated with Bono perhaps exists
mainly in the fact of its representation at high-profile
international events. However, this last feature is by
no means unique to discourses. As Ankersmit (2002,
115) puts it, perhaps overstating the point, “without
political representation we are without a conception
of what reality—the represented—is like; without it,
political reality has neither face nor contours. Without
representation there is no represented.”
To constitute formally a Chamber of Discourses
would require to begin a way of identifying and de-
scribing the array of relevant discourses on an issue.
Wewould then need away to designate representatives
of each discourse (or of positions in the array of dis-
courses).Members of theChamber ofDiscourses could
not be elected because then they would represent con-
stituencies of individuals. Another option would be
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through random selection—as advocated, for example,
in Leib’s (2004) proposal for a fourth “popular” branch
of government in the United States. The problem with
random selection is that large numbers are needed to
guard against the possibility that a relevant discourse
might be missed. However, the larger the number of
representatives, the harder it becomes for them to de-
liberate together. This is why large-scale processes such
as deliberative opinion polls and citizens’ assemblies
subdivide their participants into smaller deliberative
groups of no more than 20 or so each. Thus, we need a
procedure better than random chance to ensure that all
discourses are effectively represented in each group.
Amore economical alternativewould involve consti-
tuting a deliberative minipublic of around 15 to 20 citi-
zens, the kind of number now used extensively in insti-
tutions such as citizens’ juries, consensus conferences,
and planning cells. The standard procedure is to begin
with an initial random sample of citizens, and then tar-
get individuals with particular social characteristics—
age, education, place of residence, income, ethnicity,
and so forth. This is essentially a “politics of pres-
ence” kind of approach to representation (Phillips
1995). However, discursive representation involves (in
Phillips’ terms) a “politics of ideas.” There is no guar-
antee or even strong likelihood that people with dif-
ferent social characteristics will in fact represent dif-
ferent discourses, or that a reasonably full range of
social characteristics will guarantee a reasonably full
range of discourses is present in the forum. Discursive
representation can improve the deliberative capacities
of institutional designs featuring random selection by
ensuring that a comprehensive range of discourses is
present. Fortunately, there are methods available to
both (a)map the constellation of discourses relevant to
an issue and (b) determine which individuals best rep-
resent each discourse.We now describe somemethods.
These methods illustrate what is possible. Our basic ar-
gument for discursive representation does not depend
on commitment to any or all of them.
SYSTEMATIC SELECTION OF DISCURSIVE
REPRESENTATIVES
Davies, Sherlock, and Rauschmayer (2005) show how
Q methodology can be used to recruit individuals who
best represent particular arguments to deliberative
mini-publics. Q methodology involves measuring an
individual’s subjective orientation to an issue area in
terms of his or her ranking of a set of 35 to 60 state-
ments about the issue in a “Q sort.” These statements
can be keyed to the five features of discourses listed
previously: ontology, agency, motives of agents, rela-
tionships, and metaphors (although this is not done
by Davies, Sherlock, and Rauschmayer). For example,
in a study of discourses surrounding local sustainabil-
ity issues in the United Kingdom, Barry and Proops
(1999, 342) deploy 36 statements. One of their state-
ments about ontology is “LETS [local employment and
trading systems] is a new type of economy in which
sustainability is a key aspect.” A statement referring
to agency is “We all have to take responsibility for
environmental problems.” A statement on motives is
“People are taking a short-termview: they’re not think-
ing about the long term.” One about relationships is
“You can’t look at one part of the planet, because all
the parts interact.”6
The ranking process is itself reflective, so consistent
with the notion that discourses can be transformed and
winnowed in the process of their representation. Indi-
viduals from the subject population are asked to order
the statements into amanageable number of categories
from“most agree” to “most disagree.”The subject pop-
ulation could be several hundred individuals selected
at random (Q methodologists are happy working with
much smaller numbers of subjects, but the link we are
trying to make here to representation means that a
larger number might be required to help us find partic-
ularly good representatives of each discourse). The Q
sorts so produced can then be factor analyzed; factor
analysis is essentially a summary procedure that pro-
duces amanageable number of (in this case) discourses.
We can compute a loading (correlation coefficient) be-
tween each discourse and each individual. Those indi-
viduals loading highest on a particular discourse will
make particularly good discursive representatives—at
least in the sense that they are characteristic of the dis-
course in question, although, of course, they can vary in
how articulate they are when it comes to deliberation
itself. However, there may be circumstances in which
it is desirable to select more complex individuals who
load on more than one discourse (as we see later).
To take an example, consider the study of politi-
cal discourses in Russia in the late 1990s reported in
Dryzek and Holmes (2002, 92–113). This study identi-
fied three discourses. The first, chastened democracy,
remained committed to democracy despite current po-
litical disasters. The second, reactionary antiliberalism,
regretted the demise of the Soviet Union and opposed
the postcommunist status quo. The third, authoritarian
6 Although Barry and Proops do not have a “metaphors” category,
an example of a relevant metaphor statement about sustainability is
“If we continue with activities which destroy our environment and
undermine the conditions for our survival, we are a virus” (speech by
UK Environment Minister Michael Meacher, Newcastle University,
14 February 2003). Many (but not all) Q methodologists describe
what theydoas a formofdiscourse analysis. The justification for using
principles of political discourse analysis to select the statements that
are the grist for the Q analysis (Q sample) is established by Dryzek
and Berejikian (1993). We can begin by generating several hun-
dred statements relevant to an issue (which can be done by holding
discussion groups and transcribing what is said, or surveying sources
such as newspaper letters columns, talkback radio, political speeches,
weblogs, etc.). We then apply a sampling frame to select around 35
to 60 statements for the Q sort itself. The frame can be based on the
five categories we introduced previously in defining the concept of
discourse: ontology (entities whose existence is affirmed or denied),
agency (who or what has the capacity to act, and who or what does
not), motives ascribed to agents, relationships (e.g., hierarchies on
the basis of expertise, age, wealth, or gender; or their corresponding
equalities), and metaphors and other rhetorical devices. Once the
statements are classified, the required numbers of statements can
be selected from each category. Dryzek and Berejikian and Barry
and Proops also use a second dimension for statement categoriza-
tion based on the kind of claim made in the statement (definitive,
designative, evaluative, advocative).
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development, disapproves of both the Soviet Union
and the postcommunist present, seeking a better eco-
nomic future under a disciplined autocracy. Among
the Russians interviewed, the person with the highest
loading on chastened democracy (70, where 100 would
indicate perfect agreement) is a public relations man-
ager who describes herself as a liberal. The person with
the highest loading (59) on reactionary antiliberalism
is a teacher who describes himself as a Russian nation-
alist. The two people with the equal highest loading
(60) on authoritarian development are a student who
describes herself as a nonpartisan atheist and a con-
struction worker who claims not to care about politics.
Assuming they are articulate, these individuals would
on the face of it make particularly good representatives
for any forum in which representation of the discourse
in question is required—within Russia, or even inter-
nationally. (At meetings of international economic or-
ganizations, it could be instructive to have somebody
representing authoritarian development.)
Most Q studies seek only to map discourses present.
Davies, Sherlock, andRauschmayer (2005) useQ to se-
lect participants for deliberative forums. We can desig-
nate those participants as representatives of discourses.
In most theories of representation, those represented
somehow authorize the representation. The method
we have described seems to substitute social science
for political process, with the risk of empowering an
unaccountable social scientific elite. We address proce-
dures for countering this hazard in the “Authorization
and Accountability” section, but one check might be
to expand the range of methods used, to which we now
turn.
OTHER METHODS FOR SELECTING
DISCURSIVE REPRESENTATIVES
Although we have discussed Q methodology as a par-
ticularly systematic way to identify relevant discourses
and choose discursive representatives, there are other
ways. When it comes to discourse identification, there
exist in many issue areas enumerations of relevant dis-
courses basedonhistorical analysis. So, for example, for
U.S. environmental politics, Brulle (2000) enumerates
seven discourses on the environmental side: wildlife
management, conservation, preservation, reform en-
vironmentalism, deep ecology, environmental justice,
and ecofeminism, along with an antienvironmental dis-
course of “manifest destiny.” In criminal justice pol-
icy, at least four discourses can be enumerated. One
stresses the psychopathology of criminals, a second
treats crime as a matter of rational choice, a third
emphasizes the social causes of crime, and a fourth
the social dislocation of individual offenders. Each dis-
course comes with a range of treatments: respectively,
retribution, deterrence, social policy, and restorative
justice. In the criminal justice policy area, one could
imagine constituting a chamber with representatives
from these different discourses. In these environmental
and criminal justice examples, it is not difficult to iden-
tify individual activists, publicists, or politicians associ-
ated with each discourse, who could serve as discursive
representatives.
Q is an interpretive methodology that happens to
be quantitative, but other interpretive methods for dis-
course analysis are qualitative or ethnographic. Both
in-depth interviews with individuals and focus groups
could be used to map relevant discourses in an issue
area. Hochschild (1981) analyzes 28 in-depth inter-
views of rich and poor Americans in order to map
different beliefs about distributive justice and the sorts
of distributive rules that should be applied to different
policy areas. Despite considerable ambiguity and in-
consistency among her subjects, Hochschild’s analysis
could be mined for discourses and their representa-
tives. Notably, Hochschild finds six kinds of distributive
rule applied by her subjects, although their application
is issue-area specific. However, for example, when it
comes to policy for financing schools, it would be pos-
sible to identify using her analysis an individual who
subscribes to a discourse of need, one that stresses
performance, and so forth. An ethnographic study that
beganwith the intent of identifying discourses and their
representatives would enable a much sharper focus.
Opinion surveys could also inform the identifica-
tion of relevant discourses, although their lack of in-
terpretive depth may mean that they have to be sup-
plemented by other sorts of analysis. So, for example,
Kempton, Boster, and Hartley (1995) combine surveys
and semistructured interviews. They find a vernacular
environmental discourse that appears to be shared by
most ordinary people in the United States (including
categories of people they targeted for explicit antienvi-
ronmental sentiments), although for some individuals
in-depth interviews reveal that it is overridden by dis-
courses that stress either employment and social justice
or cynicism about the way environmental values get
deployed (215). Discursive representation here would
mean identifying individuals who prioritized the latter
two discourses, as well as those who did not.
There are then a number of methods that could be
deployed to select discursive representatives. Different
methods might yield different representations, just
as different electoral systems produce different
configurations of political parties. Triangulation across
different methods might increase our confidence in
the validity of any particular representation, although
it would be of little help should representations differ.
However, in the latter case, there would be no problem
in using different methods to pick different discursive
representatives. One method might simply pick up
on a discourse that another method missed. For
example, opinion surveys would miss subjugated or
marginal discourses that were not preconceived by the
survey designer; it might take in-depth interviews or Q
methodology to reveal these.We should also allow that
particular discoursesmay only crystallize in the process
of selection of their representatives. In-depth inter-
views might well have such an effect, especially if they
have the salutary effects that psychotherapists claim.
Among alternative methods for the selection of dis-
cursive representatives, Q methodology or in-depth
interviews should be used when the content and
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configuration of relevant discourses is weakly under-
stood. In-depth interviews should be used to tease
out discourses that have yet to crystallize fully in the
understandings of any actor. Opinion surveys can be
used when the content of relevant discourses is well
understood and/or financial constraints suggest a low-
cost method. Historical methods are appropriate when
conducting interviews is impossible, too expensive, or
the population from which one might select discursive
representatives is highly dispersed (as in transnational
affairs).
DIFFERENT SORTS OF DISCURSIVE
REPRESENTATIVES
Choosing as representatives for participation in delib-
eration only those individuals who are strongly iden-
tified with particular discourses is not necessarily the
most defensible procedure. Discursive psychology sug-
gests that the typical individual actually has access to
more than one discourse. In this light, choosing individ-
uals who identify strongly with a single discourse might
look a bit like selecting for extremism. One solution
here might be to constitute two deliberating subcham-
bers, one made up of individuals initially identifying
strongly with single discourses, the other made up of
individuals identified with two or more discourses. The
first groupmight thenbebest at openingup the relevant
range of issues, whereas the second might be better at
reaching reflective judgment across discourses. Alter-
natively, we might decide what we actually want the
deliberating group to do, and select for extremism and
moderation accordingly. If the deliberating forum is
akin to a jury delivering a verdict (say, a health care
committee deciding whether an expensive lifesaving
treatment is warranted in a particular case), we might
want to select for moderation across discourses. If we
want the forum to generate ideas (e.g., on a novel pol-
icy problem), we might want to select for extremism
in discursive representation.7 However, in light of the
possibility of deliberation-induced change in individu-
als’ commitments to particular discourses, and even the
content of discourses, these suggestions remain specu-
lative. Designing empirical studies to test the effects of
different forum compositions along these lines would
actually be quite straightforward.
It might even be useful to have a Chamber of Ex-
tremism and a Chamber of Moderation sitting in par-
allel. This would be analogous to the way lower and up-
per houses currently operate in bicameral parliaments,
with the upper house expected to be a moderate house
of review controlling the partisan excesses of the lower
house. In practice, lower houses are themselves vulner-
able to excessive moderation as parties converge on
the median voter in elections, so an explicit Chamber
of Extremism might actually improve the quality of
debate by sharpening differences.
Another possible institutional design might involve
a Chamber of Moderation adjudicating the presenta-
7 Discursive representatives could reflexively help constitute the
“we” here.
tions made to it by individuals strongly associated with
particular discourses. Such a design would resemble
the way mini-publics such as citizens’ juries and con-
sensus conferences already operate, although citizen-
adjudicators in these forums are currently selected on
the basis of their lack of any prior partisanship, rather
than sympathy with multiple discourses.
In thinking about discursive representation, it is im-
portant to stress that discourses are not necessarily
reducible to the opinions of a well-defined set of sub-
scribers.Discursive psychology accepts, andQmethod-
ological studies typically confirm, that any given in-
dividual may subscribe partially to several different,
perhaps competing, discourses, each ofwhich resonates
with a particular aspect of the “self.” For this individ-
ual, different situations may then invoke different dis-
courses. Discursive representation then involves rep-
resenting discourses, not selves, even when we need
to identify individuals to articulate the discourse in
question. It is even possible that a particular discourse
may find no complete resonance with any individual,
although partial resonance withmany, attractingminor
aspects of a number of “divided selves.” How exactly
might the representation of any such discourse be orga-
nized? One solution might be to find the individual or
set of individuals loading most highly on this discourse,
even if they loadmore highly on another discourse. The
likelihood of any such fugitive discourse on any issue is
an empirical question.However, such a discourse could
conceivably represent a new understanding currently
at the margins of public opinion, with the potential
to become more significant in the future. It might, of
course, also represent an understanding on theway out,
or one that is destined to remain marginal. However,
from the point of view of problem-solving rationality
discussed previously, marginal discourses may still be
important. Representation ofmarginal discourses is es-
pecially important from the point of viewof democratic
equality to the degree dominant discourses embody
privilege and power.
DECISION AND POWER
How should decisions be reached in any formal Cham-
ber of Discourses? A theory of representation is not a
full theory of democracy, so one can imagine a variety
of decision mechanisms, including voting. Consensus
may be a plausible rule if the chamber is composed
of a small number of individuals, each of whom can
be associated with more than one discourse (so featur-
ing moderation as defined previously), although un-
desirable conformity pressures may accompany small
size. Consensus is less plausible as numbers increase,
or to the degree each participant is strongly associ-
ated with a particular discourse, although even here
we should not assume that discourses are necessarily
incommensurable.8 “Working agreements”may still be
8 Metaconsensus that structures communication and decision may
in fact be more defensible than simple consensus as the goal of
deliberation (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006).
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possible in which participants agree on a course of ac-
tion for different reasons, but understand as morally
legitimate the reasons of others (Eriksen 2006). Even
if they cannot agree onmajor issues, participants might
still practice the “economy of moral disagreement”
advocated by Gutmann and Thompson (1996), what
we could style an economy of discourse disagreement,
searching for aspects of issues representatives can
agree on. There is no justification for giving discursive
representatives veto power over decisions that affect
their discourse, of the sort that Young (1990) believes
should be possessed by representatives of oppressed
groups.
Howmuchpower should anyChamberofDiscourses
possess in relation to other sorts of representative in-
stitutions, such as legislatures? Again, a theory of rep-
resentation is not a complete theory of democracy, and
so the idea of discursive representation cannot itself
adjudicate across any competing representative claims.
Discursive representation might complement the work
of familiar institutions, rather than replace them. A
formal Chamber of Discourses could take its place in
existing institutional architecture in a variety of ways.
Mini-publics deployed so far have generally been issue
specific, authorized by legislatures or political execu-
tives, constituted for one occasion, and then dissolved
immediately afterward. This is the normal procedure
when it comes to consensus conferences, planning cells,
citizens’ juries, and the citizens’ assemblies used to
frame referendum questions on constitutional reform
in British Columbia, Ontario, and the Netherlands.
If (in contrast to the Canadian Citizens’ Assemblies,
which had a specified role in decision making) the
Chamber of Discourses is advisory, then it needs an
audience, which may be found in the broader public
sphere, as well as in the legislature. Taking the idea of
a Chamber of Discourses very literally would suggest
that it could beginwith several hundred citizens serving
a term as members of the upper house of a bicameral
legislature (a proposal of this sort was made by the De-
mos think tank in the context of debates about reform
of the House of Lords in the UK). Subsets of the house
could then be chosen along the lines we have speci-
fied to deliberate particular issues. Alternatively, these
citizens could constitute Leib’s (2004) proposed fourth
“popular” branch of government, reviewing policy pro-
posals generated in executive or legislative branches,
or generating proposals for review by the other three
branches. In nonstate and transnational contexts, it is
easier to imagine granting more substantial and per-
haps even final authority to a Chamber of Discourses,
if other sorts of representative institutions are not
available.Withinmore familiar governmental contexts,
legislative mandates for public consultation and par-
ticipation present opportunities for experimentation,
especially in cases where established forms of consul-
tation are recognized as ineffective. Liberal democratic
governments are occasionally willing to experiment, as
for example in UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s
2007 “big idea” for citizens’ juries on major policy
issues, plus a Citizens’ Summit to deliberate basic na-
tional values.
AUTHORIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Theories of representation fromPitkin (1967) toYoung
(1990, 128–33) require not only the selection of rep-
resentatives, but also their authorization by and ac-
countability to those represented. Issues concerning
authorization and accountability become pressing to
the degree a Chamber of Discourses has an explicit
share in decision-making authority. Authorization is,
on the face of it, problematic in the methods we have
described for the selection of discursive representa-
tives, which would involve social science rather than
political process. Such use of social science is already
practiced when it comes to the constitution of familiar
mini-publics such as deliberative polls, citizens’ juries,
consensus conferences, and citizens’ assemblies. Ran-
dom selection itself is a social scientific technique that
oftenmakes little sense to those not versed in social sci-
ence. The use of social characteristics to narrow down
an initial random sample into a smaller deliberating
group is again soaked in social science theories about
what individual characteristics matter, as well as as-
sumed links between social characteristics and points
of view. Furthermore, when it comes to the engineering
of electoral systems, social scientific theories inform the
selection of alternative systems (Reilly 2001) (although
as theBritishColumbiaCitizens’Assembly shows, such
theories can be made intelligible to lay citizens). Yet,
the authorization problem remains.
There are several ways to ameliorate this problem.
To begin, the social science itself can be done as demo-
cratically as possible. In the case ofQmethodology, this
principle would entail using only statements that ap-
pear in ordinary political language, not ones contrived
by the analyst. The initial set of statements should be
as comprehensive as possible in capturing the variety
of things that could be said about the issue at hand, so
as to enable capture of the extant variety of discourses.
For all methods, data should be analyzed in ways that
minimize the observer’s discretion in interpreting re-
sults. Multiple methods can be used to ensure no dis-
course is missed. Once results are produced, they can
be presented in plain language for validation by citizen
participants. In Qmethodology, it is easy to summarize
an identified discourse in narrative form (Dryzek and
Holmes 2002), and those designated as representatives
of a discourse can be asked if the narrative really does
describe them.
Once we have identified a set of individuals loading
highly on a discourse, we could ask them to select a
representative. This would require informing this set
about both the content of the discourse and the way
it was delineated. Furthermore, it may be possible to
involve citizens themselves in doing the social science.
Social scientists could still be technical consultants, but
defer to citizens when it comes to judgments about
(say) the items to be included in a Q sort or survey,
or the interpretation of in-depth interview transcripts.
Whatever use is made of social science, it is important
to make it transparent to nonexperts involved in the
forum in question. Analysts could then be account-
able before hearings, just as executive officials can be
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called before hearings of nonexpert representatives in
an elected legislature. However, those conducting the
hearings could not be discursive representatives be-
cause they would have been selected by the procedure
they are assessing. Instead, they could be drawn from
the larger pool from which discursive representatives
are selected. As a final check, validation of the config-
uration of discursive representatives could be sought
from actors in the broader public sphere by inviting
their comments on forum composition.
Accountability cannot in discursive representation
be induced by the representative’s fear of sanction
because there is no subsequent election at which the
representative might be punished. Discursive account-
ability must be understood instead in communicative
fashion. To be accountable to the discourse (or dis-
courses) they represent, representatives must continue
to communicate in terms that make sense within that
discourse (or discourses), even as they encounter dif-
ferent others in the Chamber of Discourses, and even
as they reflect and change their minds in such encoun-
ters. If, in the limiting case, representatives seem to
be abandoning their discourse and adopting another
(as happened in the environmental citizens’ jury we
discussed previously), then discursive accountability
requires that any shift make sense in the terms es-
tablished by the original discourse.9 This requirement
is not necessarily met when, for example, social jus-
tice advocates get drawn into the language of stability,
security, and efficiency; when environmentalists aban-
don the language of intrinsic value in nature, and start
speaking in terms of how preserving nature has eco-
nomic benefits; or when advocates of an ethical foreign
policy slip into the language of realism. Discursive ac-
countability can be facilitated by publicity, such that
representatives are always mindful of how what they
say will be received in the terms of the discourse(s)
that validate their representation. Discursive represen-
tatives do not have to be “delegates” of discourses,
unable to reflect and change their minds. However, if
theydo change theirminds, theymust justify the change
in terms set by the discourse(s) they represent.
A MORE INFORMAL CHAMBER OF
DISCOURSES
We noted at the outset that discourses currently get
represented in mostly informal fashion (e.g., by high-
profile activists such as Bono). Contemporary demo-
cratic theory can welcome this kind of activity, es-
pecially in conceptualizations of deliberative democ-
racy that emphasize the engagement of discourses in
a broad public sphere (see the “Discourses in Theo-
ries of Deliberative Democracy” section). Discourses
are generated within and populate the public sphere,
9 This requirement was in fact met in the citizens’ jury. The two
discourses were not mutually exclusive (orthogonal), enabling those
who shifted to reason their way from the original discourse on which
they loaded to a more exclusive association with preservationism in
a way that couldmake sense to those outside the jury who subscribed
to the original discourse.
and so a more informal Chamber of Discourses could
be grounded in this public sphere. Historically, new
discourses have been brought onto the democratic
agenda from oppositional public spheres, outside the
formal institutions of the state. Think, for example,
of how environmentalism and feminism arrived in the
1960s. In some cases, these discourses were brought
very quickly into governing processes—environmen-
talism in the United States in 1970, and feminism in
Scandinavian countries around the same time. (How-
ever, the result in these countries was rapid attenuation
of any radical critique associated with the discourse.)
This informal chamber could coexist with the formal
chamber we have described, and they could be linked
as elements in what Hendriks (2006, 499–502) calls an
“integrated deliberative system.” Within that system,
representatives in the informal chamber could present
discourses for validation in the formal chamber. These
informal representatives could also exercise critical
oversight over the constellation of discourses identified
for the formal chamber (as indicated in our previous
discussion of discursive accountability).
If we think of a Chamber of Discourses in these
informal terms, then it would seem at first sight that all
that needs to be done is to leave it alone. In Haber-
mas’ terms, the public sphere is a “wild” zone that
can be protected by, for example, a standard range of
liberal rights to free belief, expression, assembly, and
association. Beyond that, critics might need to expose
and counter agents of distortion in the public sphere,
such as the influence exercised by large media corpo-
rations, lack of material resources meaning that some
sorts of voices do not get heard, hegemonic discourses
that serve the interests of the powerful, and so forth.
In this light, discourses get representedby thenormal
array of actors present in the public sphere. However,
the idea of discursive representation enables and pro-
vides criteria for reevaluation of some standard norma-
tive treatments of civil society. Putnam (2000) dispar-
ages “checkbook” groups such as the Sierra Club that
demand nothingmore thanmoney from theirmembers
and that have little in the way of internal participation
of the sort that might help build social capital in the
larger society in which the Sierra Club operates. In
light of discursive representation, Putnam’s criticism
misses the point. Checkbook groups may build discur-
sive capital (in the sense of facilitating the articulation
of discourses), if not social capital. The Sierra Club ex-
ists to represent a particular discourse of environmen-
tal preservation, and contributors to the Sierra Club
express solidarity with that discourse. Discursive ac-
countability can be sought by these leaders continuing
to communicate in terms that make sense within the
discourse of preservation (even as they engage other
discourses). If leaders could not justify their actions
in these terms, contributors can back other groups in-
stead.
Discourses engaging in the broad public sphere get
represented to more authoritative political structures
(e.g., states) through a variety of mechanisms. Public
opinion defined in the engagement of discourses can
reach the state or other public authority, and so find
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representation. In his “two-track” model of deliber-
ation in the public sphere influencing deliberation in
the legislature, Habermas (1996) (very conventionally)
eventually stresses elections. In this light, we might
evaluate electoral systems by how well they represent
discourses. For example, preferential voting as prac-
ticed inAustralia almost guarantees a two-party system
in parliament. However, minor discourses get repre-
sented even when nobody in parliament is formally
associated with them because the two major parties
need to cultivate minor parties in order to receive their
voters’ second preferences, so preferential voting may
at least bebetter thanfirst-past-thepost plurality voting
in representing discourses. However, elections are not
the only transmission mechanisms. Others include the
use of rhetoric by activists, influence on the terms of
political discussion that can change the understandings
of government actors, and arguments that are heard by
public officials (Dryzek 2000). Conceptualizing such
transmission mechanisms as forms of discursive rep-
resentation drives home the need to subject them to
critical scrutiny. Rhetoric, in particular, is often treated
with suspicion by democratic theorists, on the grounds
of its capacity for emotionalmanipulation and coercion
(e.g., Chambers 1996, 151). However, rhetoric may be
vital in representing a discourse to those in positions
of political authority not initially subscribing to it. The
solution here would be to hold rhetoric to standards
such as noncoerciveness and theneed to connect partic-
ular interests to general principles. The latter could, for
example, curb the racist or ethnic nationalist rhetoric
of demagogues.
In addition, all forms of transmission need to be held
to the discursive accountability standard introduced
previously. People claiming to represent a discourse or
discourses should always communicate in terms that
make sense within the discourse or discourses in ques-
tion, even when they contemplate shifting in relation
to the constellation of discourses they subsequently
encounter. This standard is probably met more easily
to the degree representatives keep their distance from
explicit participation in collective decision making in,
for example, corporatist arrangements.
In the case of networked governance, discursive ac-
countability could be facilitated by specifying that a
network does not require as the price of entry that
participants commit to the hegemonic discourse of
the network and renounce other relevant discourses.
This kind of accountability would be hard to secure in
transnational financial networks, which currently ex-
clude discourses of sustainability and social justice.
Informal discursive representation may currently be
found directed toward familiar and conventional au-
thority structures (e.g., states and international organi-
zations). However, this informal representation could
also mesh with any formal Chamber of Discourses. In
this context, public sphere activism could provide a
check on the degree to which the formal chamber fea-
tures a comprehensive and accurate set of the relevant
discourses, and promote discursive accountability by




Representing discourses in transnational political ac-
tion is actually more straightforward than represent-
ing persons (especially in the absence of elections).
Indeed, it is already happening. In recent years, even
economistic global institutions such as theWorld Bank
and (begrudgingly) the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) have begun a program of outreach to global civil
society, meaning accountability no longer runs strictly
to states. Who elects the NGOs? Nobody. Is there an
identifiable constituency or category of people with
which each NGO is associated and to which it is ac-
countable? Not usually. International relations schol-
ars have started to think about accountability (Grant
andKeohane 2005), albeitmainly in terms of how sanc-
tions can be levied on advocates, rather than discursive
accountability as we have characterized it. However,
NGOs pushing for human rights, fair trade, sustainable
development, demilitarization, transparency, and so
forth, may best be thought of as representatives of par-
ticular discourses in international politics. Is the world
any more democratic for their activities? Clearly, yes,
the international governmental institutions they target
now have to justify their activities in light of a variety
of discourses, whereas previously they either felt no
need to justify at all, or did so in narrowly economistic
and administrative terms. Thus, the idea of discursive
representation provides democratic validation for the
activities of NGOs and other transnational activists.
This kind of transnational discursive representation
is currently informal in character, but more formal
representation can be imagined. Thompson (1999) sug-
gests that cross-border policy impacts can be brought
into democratic accountability by the device of a “tri-
bune for non-citizens.” Such a tribune could not easily
be elected —the appropriate electorate would be dis-
persed and extraordinarily hard to organize. However,
for particular policy issues, it would be possible to iden-
tify relevant extranational or transnational discourses,
and identify a good representative for them. For ex-
ample, there exists a very well-defined transnational
discourse of sustainable development. Perhaps global
sustainability tribunes could be identified to represent
this discourse in particular national governments. The
problem, of course, is that those representatives would
be least welcome where they were needed most. One
can imagine them being welcomed by countries that
are exemplary international citizens (Sweden), but re-
sisted by countries that are poor international citizens,
those that subscribe to hard-line notions of sovereignty,
superpowers, and rogue states.
For most states, transnational discursive representa-
tion will probably have to be informal in any foresee-
able future, constituted mostly by NGOs and networks
of political activists in transnational public spheres ex-
erting pressure. It is easier to envisage more formal
Chambers ofDiscourses established in associationwith
international organizations. Organizations such as the
WTO, IMF, and World Bank have (as we have noted)
accepted the need to legitimate their activities beyond
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the states that are their members, funders, or clients.
Constituting formal Chambers of Discourses would be
one very public way of discharging this obligation.
CONCLUSION
Once the basic idea of discursive representation is ac-
cepted, choices need to bemade on several dimensions.
Should discursive representation be formal, informal,
or an integrated combination of both? Discursive rep-
resentation could be formalized, especially in connec-
tion with growing enthusiasm for the constitution of
mini-publics to deliberate complex and controversial
policy issues, and as a way for governments to meet
mandated requirements for public consultation. If dis-
cursive representation is formal, what method should
we use to select representatives? How much authority
should any Chamber of Discourses possess in relation
to other representative institutions? There is no univer-
sal answer to any of these questions, although we have
provided guidance about how each might be answered
in particular contexts.
We have argued that discursive representation al-
ready occurs, although it is not always recognized as
such.Whether formal, informal, or an integratedmix of
both, discursive representation can help render policy
making more rational, respect individual autonomy by
more fully representing diverse aspects of the self, assist
in realizing the promise of deliberative democracy, and
make democratic theory more applicable to a world
where the consequences of decisions are felt across
national boundaries.
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